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A compact axiomatic characterization of the modified Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure (Banzhaf–Owen
value, for short) is provided. The axiomatic system used here can be compared with parallel axiomatizations of other coalitional
values such as the Owen value or the Alonso–Fiestras value, thus giving arguments to defend the use of one of them that will
depend on the context where they are to be applied.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.JEL classification: C71
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The assessment of the strategic position of each
player in any game is a main objective of cooperative
game theory, as it can be applied to e.g. sharing costs or
profits in economic problems or measuring the power of
each agent in a collective decision-making system. The
Shapley value φ is the best known concept in this
respect, and its axiomatic presentation (Shapley [41],
also in Roth [40]) introduced a new, elegant style in
game theory and opened a fruitful research line (see
Winter [48], and Monderer and Samet [29]).
The first attempt to provide a power measure is,
probably, the work produced by Luther Martin in the⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: meijide@lugo.usc.es (J.M. Alonso-Meijide).
0167-9236/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2006.11.0081780’s, shown in Riker [39]. (The reader may find an
interesting history and discussion of power indices in
Felsenthal and Machover [20].) As a sort of reaction to
the application of φ to simple games as a power index,
suggested by Shapley and Shubik [42], and following a
more classical procedure, Banzhaf [12] introduced a
different index of power (essentially equivalent to those
proposed by Penrose [38] and Coleman [17]) that gave
rise to a Banzhaf value β on all cooperative games first
defined by Owen [32]. Many axiomatic characteriza-
tions of one, the other or both values may be found in the
literature (see, e.g., Owen [34], Dubey and Shapley [19],
Young [49], Lehrer [27], Straffin [43], Amer and
Carreras [7], Nowak [30] or Laruelle and Valenciano
[25]). A most interesting one was given by Feltkamp
[21], who gave parallel characterizations of the Shapley
and Banzhaf values that enhance the similarities and
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distinguishes these values: efficiency for the Shapley
value versus total power for the Banzhaf value.
Forming coalitions is a most natural behavior in
cooperative games, and the evaluation of the conse-
quences that derive from this action is also of great
interest to game theorists. Games with a coalition
structure were first considered by Aumann and Drèze
[11], who extended the Shapley value to this new
framework in such a manner that the game really splits
into subgames played by the unions isolatedly from each
other, and every player receives the payoff allocated to
him by the Shapley value in the subgame he is playing
within his union. A second approach was used by Owen
[33] (also in Owen [36]), when introducing and
axiomatically characterizing his coalitional value Φ
(Owen value). In this case, the unions play a quotient
game among themselves, and each one receives a payoff
which, in turn, is shared among its players in an internal
game. Both payoffs, in the quotient game for unions and
within each union for its players, are given by the
Shapley value. In addition to the initial one, many other
axiomatic characterizations of Φ can be found in the
literature (Hart and Kurz [24], Winter [47], Amer and
Carreras [8,9], Vázquez et al. [44], Hamiache [23] or
Albizuri [2] among others).
By applying a similar procedure to the Banzhaf
value, Owen [35] obtained a second coalitional value,
the modified Banzhaf value Ψ for games with a
coalition structure or Banzhaf–Owen value. Here, the
payoffs at both levels, that of the unions in the quotient
game and that of the players within each union, are
given by the Banzhaf value. In this case, no axiomat-
ization was initially provided. A first axiomatic
characterization was reached by Albizuri [1], but only
on the restricted domain of (monotonic) simple games.
Amer et al. [10] were the first to establish a
characterization of Ψ on the full domain of all
cooperative games. However, as they said in Remark
3.3(b) under a suggestion of a referee of their article,
their characterization is far from giving rise to an almost
common axiomatization of both Φ and Ψ similar to
Feltkamp's one for φ and β. (For a wide generalization
of Owen's procedure to coalitional semivalues, which
encompasses the four coalitional values that will be
considered here, the interested reader is referred to
Albizuri and Zarzuelo [3]. For a way of extending to
games with coalition structure the notion of sharing
function, please see van den Brink and van der Laan
[13].)
Our aim here is to provide a new axiomatic
characterization for the Banzhaf–Owen value Ψ thatis able to be compared with some of the existing ones
for Φ and, specifically, with the characterization
reached by Vázquez et al. [44]. We will also discuss
several series of axioms found in the literature and
other values closely related to the Banzhaf–Owen
value. Moreover, we will express our detailed opinion
on the relevance of axiomatizations and the conve-
nience of considering them with an open mind. We
briefly quote from Section 4.3:
“Then, why axiomatic systems? There are some
reasons for this interest of game theorists in getting
them. First, for a mathematically elegant and
pleasant spirit. Second, because a set of basic (and
assumed independent and hence minimal) properties
is a most convenient and economic tool to decide on
the use of the value. Finally, such a set allows a
researcher to compare a given value with others and
select the most suitable one for the problem he or she
is facing each time.”
The organization of the paper is as follows. In
Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries is provided. In
Section 3 we give the axiomatic characterization of the
Banzhaf–Owen value. Section 4 is devoted to compar-
ing it with parallel axiomatizations of Φ, of Alonso and
Fiestras' symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value π
(Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro [6]) and even of
a sort of “counterpart” value μ introduced by Amer et al.
[10] (both to be defined below in due time) and to
discussing by the way our results. Section 5 summarizes
our conclusions.
2. Preliminaries
Although the reader is assumed to be generally
familiar with cooperative game theory, we recall here
some basic notions.
2.1. Games and values
A finite transferable utility cooperative game (from
now on, simply a game) is a pair (N, v) defined by a
finite set of players N, usually N={1, 2, …, n}, and a
function v : 2NYR, that assigns to each coalition S⊆N
a real number v(S) and satisfies v(t)=0. Given a finite
set N and a coalition S⊆N, we denote by (N, δS) the
Dirac game of coalition S (Feltkamp [21]), given by
δS(T)=1 if T=S and δS(T)=0, otherwise. In the sequel,
GN will denote the family of all games on a given N and
G the family of all games.
A player i∈N is a dummy in game (N,v) if v(S∪{i})=v
(S)+v({i}) for all S⊆N \{i}, that is, if all his marginal
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symmetric in game (N, v) if v(S∪{i})=v(S∪{j}) for all
S⊆N \{i,j}, i.e., if their marginal contributions to each
coalition coincide.
By a value we will mean a map f that assigns to every
game ðN ; vÞaG a vector f ðN ; vÞaRN with components
fi(N,v) for all i∈N.
Definition 2.1. (Owen [32]) The Banzhaf value β is the
value defined by





v S [ if gð Þ  v Sð Þ½ 
for any iaN and any N ; vð ÞaG:
ð1Þ
2.2. Games with a coalition structure
Let us consider a finite set, say, N={1, 2, …, n}. We
will denote by P(N) the set of all partitions of N. Each
P∈P(N), of the form P={P1, P2, …, Pm}, is called a
coalition structure or system of unions on N. The so-
called trivial coalition structures are Pn={{l}, {2}, …,
{n}}, where each union is a singleton, and PN={N},
where the grand coalition forms. Given i∈N, P(i) will
denote the subfamily of coalition structures P∈P(N)
such that {i}∈P. If i∈Pk∈P, P−i will denote the
partition obtained from P when player i leaves union Pk
and becomes isolated, i.e.,
Pi ¼ fPhaP : h p kg [ fPkqfig; figg:
A cooperative game with a coalition structure is a
triple (N, v, P) where ðN ; vÞaG and P∈P(N). The set of
all cooperative games with a coalition structure will be
denoted by Gcs, and by GcsN the subset where N is the
player set.
If ðN ; v;PÞaGcs and P={P1, P2, …, Pm}, the quoti-
ent game (M, vP) is the cooperative game played by the
unions, or, rather, by the set M={1, 2, …, m} of their
representatives, as follows:
vPðRÞ ¼ vð [
raR
PrÞ for all RpM : ð2Þ
Notice that (M, vP) is nothing but (N, v) whenever
P=Pn. A not completely trivial case is the following.
Example 2.2. Let ðN ; vÞaG be given and i, j∈N be
distinct players. Let Pi,j be the coalition structure of N
where just i and j form a union while the remaining
players stay all isolated. In this case, we can slightly
alter the notations, take ij as a new player representing
both i and j and each other player k as representing
himself, thus considering Ni,j={ij, 1, 2, …, î, …, ĵ, …, n}(where î and ĵ mean that i and j have been removed) as
quotient player set and, as quotient game, the game vi,j
defined by
vi;jðSÞ ¼ vðSÞ and
vi;jðS [ fijgÞ ¼ vðS [ fi; jgÞ for any SpNqfi; jg:
As we see, this game, considered by Lehrer [27] and
Nowak [30] in their axiomatizations of the Banzhaf
value and called “reduced game” or “amalgamation of i
and j”, is nothing but the simplest non-trivial example of
a quotient game. Its generalization to the case where,
instead of {i,j}, some coalition S ⊆ N with |S|≥2 forms
is straightforward.
By a coalitional value we will mean a map g that
assigns to every game with a coalition structure (N, v, P)
a vector gðN ; v;PÞaRN with components gi(N, v, P) for
each i∈N.
Definition 2.3. (Owen [35]) The Banzhaf–Owen value
Ψ is the coalitional value defined by









 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½  ð3Þ
for all i∈N and all ðN ; v;PÞaGcs, where Pk∈P is the
union such that i∈ Pk, m = |M |, pk = |Pk | and
Q ¼ [raR Pr.
Definition 2.4. Given a value f on G, a coalitional value
g on Gcs is a coalitional f-value if
gðN ; v;PnÞ ¼ f ðN ; vÞ for all ðN ; vÞaG: ð4Þ
3. An axiomatic approach
We shall consider the following properties for a
coalitional value g on Gcs.
A1. (2-Efficiency) For all ðN ; vÞaG, and any pair of
distinct players i, j∈N,
giðN ; v;PnÞ þ gjðN ; v;PnÞ ¼ gijðNi;j; vi;j;Pn1Þ:
A2. (Dummy player) If i∈N is a dummy in (N, v) then
gi(N, v, P
n)=v({i}).
A3. (Symmetry) If i, j∈N are symmetric players in
(N, v) then gi(N, v, P
n)=gj(N, v, P
n).
A4. (Equal marginal contributions) If (N, v) and (N, w)
are games with a common player set N, and some player
i∈N satisfies v(S∪{i})−v(S)=w(S∪{i})−w(S) for all
S⊆N\{i}, then gi(N, v, Pn)=gi(N, w, Pn).
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ðN ; v;PÞaGcs, Pk∈P and i, j∈Pk are distinct players,
then
giðN ; v;PÞ ¼ giðN ; v;PjÞ:
A6. (1-Quotient game property) If ðN ; v;PÞaGcs and
P∈P(i) for some i∈N, then
giðN ; v;PÞ ¼ gkðM ; vP;PmÞ;
where Pk={i}.
Axioms A2 and A3 (also called equal treatment
property) are standard in the literature. Axiom A1 was
introduced by Lehrer [27] in a slightly different form (as
an inequality), although it was soon discovered (see,
e.g., Carreras and Magaña [14]) that equality holds, as
reported also by Nowak [30], while A4 was introduced
by Young [49]. We refer to these sources, and also to
Haller [22] and Malawski [28], for discussions about the
meaning and scope of these properties. The discussion
on axioms A5 and A6 will be done in the next section.
We will first establish a close relationship between
the coalitional values satisfying A1–A4 and the Banzhaf
value. More precisely:
Proposition 3.1. A coalitional value g satisfies A1–A4
if, and only if, it is a coalitional Banzhaf value, i.e.
giðN ; v;PnÞ ¼ biðN ; vÞ for all iaN and all
ðN ; vÞaG: ð5Þ
Proof. The proof follows the same guidelines as
Nowak's [30] (non-trivial) proof. The only difference
between Nowak's statement and ours is that he is talking
about values, whereas we are referring to coalitional
values, although the connection is given by the
appearance of the trivial coalition structure Pn in our
axiom set A1–A4. □
Remark 3.2. The interest of this first result lies in the
existence of an analogous result for the Shapley value,
obtained by Young [49] and also cited by Nowak [30]
(the difference will be explained in the next section).
This is a sort of starting point for our aim to “put in
parallel” the Owen value Φ (as a coalitional Shapley
value) and the Banzhaf–Owen value Ψ (a coalitional
Banzhaf value in the above sense).
Now, we are ready to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 3.3. (Existence and uniqueness) A coalitional
value g satisfies A1–A6 if, and only if, it is the Banzhaf–
Owen coalitional value Ψ. In other words, Ψ is the
unique coalitional Banzhaf value that satisfies A5 and
A6.Proof. (a) (Existence) 1. The Banzhaf–Owen coali-
tional value Ψ satisfies A1–A4. According to Proposi-
tion 3.1, it suffices to check Eq. (5). Let ðN ; vÞaG and
i∈N. As we will deal with P=Pn, we have M=N,
Pk={i} so that k= i and pk=1, T=t and Q=R when
applying formula (3). Thus









 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½ 
reduces to






v R [ if gð Þ  v Rð Þ½ 
¼ bi N ; vð Þ:
2. The Banzhaf–Owen value Ψ satisfies A5, the
property of neutrality under individual desertion. Let
ðN ; v;PÞaGcs;PkaP and i, j∈Pk be distinct players.
Let
Pj ¼ fP1V;P2V; N ;Pmþ1V g;
where Ph′=Ph for every h∈M \{k}, Pk′=Pk \{j} and
P′m+1={j}, and letM′=(1, 2,… ,m,m+l}. Then,m′=m+1
and pk′=pk−1 so that
Wi N ; v;Pj








 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½ 
reduces, by separating the cases m+1∈R and m+1 ∉ R
and grouping terms again, to
Wi N ; v;Pj








 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½ 
¼ Wi N ; v;Pð Þ:
3. The Banzhaf–Owen value Ψ satisfies A6, the 1-
quotient game property. Let ðN ; v;PÞaGcs be such that
P∈P(i), and let Pk={i}. Then pk=1, so that T=t and
therefore









 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½ 
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vP R [ kf gð Þ  vP Rð Þ 
¼ bk M ; vP
  ¼ Wi M ; vP;Pm :
(b) (Uniqueness) Let us assume for the moment that
two coalitional Banzhaf values g1 and g2 satisfy
neutrality under individual desertion (A5) and the 1-
quotient game (A6). Then we can find a game (N, v) and
a coalition structure P on N with the maximum number
of unions such that g1(N, v, P)≠g2 (N, v, P), i.e., gi1
(N, v, P) ≠ gi2(N, v, P) for some i∈N.
As g1 and g2 are coalitional Banzhaf values, it
follows that m<n. Let us take Pk∈P such that i∈Pk.
Two possible cases arise:
• |Pk| =1. Then, Pk={i}. By A6 we have
g1i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ g1k ðM ; vP;PmÞ and
g2i ðN ; v;PÞ ¼ g2k ðM ; vP;PmÞ:
Since g1 and g2 are coalitional Banzhaf values
g1k ðM ; vP;PmÞ ¼ bkðM ; vPÞ ¼ g2k ðM ; vP;PmÞ:
Therefore, gi
1(N, v, P)=gi
2 (N, v, P), a contradiction.
• |Pk| >1. Then, there is some j∈Pk such that j≠ i.
By A5,
g1i ðN ; v;PÞ ¼ g1i ðN ; v;PjÞ and
g2i ðN ; v;PÞ ¼ g2i ðN ; v;PjÞ:
By the maximality of partition P it follows that
g1i ðN ; v;PjÞ ¼ g2i ðN ; v;PjÞ;
and this leads to gi
1(N, v, P)=gi
2 (N, v, P), a contradiction
again.
Remark 3.4. (Independence of the axiomatic system)
The axiom system A1–A6 is independent. Indeed:
(i) The coalitional value g defined, with the same
notation as in case ofΨ for Eq. (3) and adding t= |T| and
r= |R|, as




ðr þ tÞ!ðmþ pk  r  t  2Þ!
ðmþ pk  1Þ!
 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½ ;
satisfies A2–A6, but not A1.(ii) The coalitional value g given by g (N, v, P)=0
for all (N, v, P)∈ Gcs satisfies A1 and A3–A6, but not
A2.
(iii) Let i and j be two distinct and fixed players. Let
g be the coalitional value defined as follows:
• If N={i, j} and P={N},
gi N ; v;Pð Þ ¼ 34 v Nð Þ  v jf gð Þ½  þ
1
4
v if gð Þ and
gj N ; v;Pð Þ ¼ 14 v Nð Þ  v if gð Þ½  þ
3
4
v jf gð Þ:
• Otherwise, for every ðN ; v;PÞaGcsqfðfi; jg; v; fNgÞg,
gkðN ; v;PÞ ¼ WkðN ; v;PÞ; for every kaN :
Then g satisfies A1–A2 and A4–A6, but not A3.
(iv) The coalitional value g defined as
giðN ; v;PÞ ¼ WiðN ; v;PÞ if ðN ; v;PÞgC0 if ðN ; v;PÞaC;

where C ¼ fðN ; v;PÞaGcs : v ¼ aSdS ; for some SqN ;
aSa Rg, satisfies A1–A3 and A5–A6, but not A4.
(v) The symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value π,
introduced by Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro [6]
and defined, with the same notation as in the case of Ψ
for Eq. (3) and adding t= |T|, by







t!ðpk  t  1Þ!
pk!
 v Q [ T [ if gð Þ  v Q [ Tð Þ½ ;
satisfies A1–A4 and A6, but not A5 (for details, see
Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro [6]). This coali-
tional value will be considered in detail in the next
section.
(vi) The coalitional value g given by g (N, v, P)=
β(N, v) for all ðN ; v;PÞaGcs satisfies A1–A5, but not
A6.
4. Discussion
This section is devoted to the analysis and criticism
of the results obtained in Section 3.
4.1. On the axioms
Some comments are in order concerning the pro-
perties we have used as axioms. First, it bears men-
tion that properties A1–A4 might be replaced with any
Table 1
Properties and coalitional values
Symbol Property Ψ π Φ μ
A1 2-Efficiency/total power OK OK
B1 Efficiency OK OK
A2 Dummy player OK OK OK OK
A3 Symmetry OK OK OK OK
A4 Equal marginal contributions OK OK OK OK
A5 Neutrality under individual desertion OK
B5 Balanced contributions within unions OK OK OK OK
A6 1-Quotient game OK OK OK OK
B6 Quotient game OK OK
B7 Symmetry in the quotient game OK OK
MLE Computation by multilinear
extensions
OK OK OK OK
706 J.M. Alonso-Meijide et al. / Decision Support Systems 43 (2007) 701–712other system of axioms that characterizes the Banzhaf
value by adding the mention of the trivial coalition
structure as we did before. In particular, A1 is
equivalent, in the presence of A2–A4, to the so-called




gi N ; v;P






v S [ if gð Þ  v Sð Þ½ 
for all N ; vð ÞaG
and can be traced back (omitting Pn) at least to Owen
[34] and Dubey and Shapley [19]. Moreover, note that
no use has been made of additivity nor of strong
monotonicity (Young [49]) in our system, although it
should be noticed that A4 is what Young calls inde-
pendence, a property weaker than strong monotonicity.
Not only φ and β, but all semivalues (see Weber [45],
Dubey et al. [18] or Weber [46] for this notion) satisfy
A2–A4 (always omitting Pn) and an ad hoc modifica-
tion of the total power property for each one of them.
A5 (neutrality under individual desertion) describes
the invariance of the allocations given by a coalitional
value to the players of any union in front of the existence
of self-isolating players in that union. This property is
stronger than the “balanced contributions property” that
will be considered below.
Finally, A6 (1-quotient game property) states that,
using the coalitional value in the original game with a
coalition structure, any isolated player gets the same
payoff as the union he forms if we use the same
coalitional value in the quotient game with the trivial
singleton structure. This property is weaker than the
“quotient game property” that will be described below.
4.2. Other properties, other values
Let us now consider, for purposes of comparison, a
new series of properties for a coalitional value that have
been used as axioms in the literature. We recall that Pk,
Ph∈P are symmetric unions in (N, v, P) if k and h are
symmetric players in the quotient game (M, vP).
B1. (Efficiency) For all ðN ; vÞaG
X
iaN
giðN ; v;PnÞ ¼ vðNÞ:
B5. (Balanced contributions within unions) For all
ðN ; v;PÞaGcs and all i, j∈Pk∈P
giðN ; v;PÞ giðN ; v;PjÞ ¼ gjðN ; v;PÞ  gjðN ; v;PiÞ:B6. (Quotient game property) For all ðN ; v;PÞaGcs and
all Pk∈PX
iaPk
giðN ; v;PÞ ¼ gkðM ; vP;PmÞ:
B7. (Symmetry in the quotient game) If Pk and Ph are
symmetric unions in (N, v, P), then
X
iaPk




As was said in Section 4.1, A5 is stronger than B5,
whereas A6 is weaker than B6. Both relations are clear.
Now, we list in Table 1 all the properties A1–A6 and
B1, B5 and B6, specifying which of them are satisfied
by each one of the four coalitional values we are
considering in this paper, namely, the Banzhaf–Owen
value Ψ, the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value or
Alonso-Fiestras value for short π (which follows
Owen's [33,35] two-step procedure but applies the
Banzhaf value in the quotient game and the Shapley
value within unions), the classical Owen value Φ, and a
“counterpart” μ of π introduced as a counterexample by
Amer et al. [10] (which uses the Shapley and Banzhaf
values in reverse order). Note therefore that these four
values cover all the variations of Owen's scheme using
the Shapley and Banzhaf values.
An OK (resp., empty) entry in the four final columns
means that the corresponding coalitional value satisfies
(resp., fails to satisfy) the corresponding property. The
proof of the positive (OK) entries and suitable counter-
examples in case of failure can be easily found in
the literature concerning these four values already
707J.M. Alonso-Meijide et al. / Decision Support Systems 43 (2007) 701–712mentioned here. It is worthy of mention that property
A1, 2-efficiency, is specific of Ψ. The total power
property for this value differs from the corresponding
one for π (see Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro [6],
although they share a common spirit.
The last row–not essential to our discussion, but nice
enough to be included here–refers to the possibility of
computing a value by using, as in thewell known cases of
the Shapley value (Owen [31]) and the Banzhaf value
(Owen [32]), the multilinear extension of the game where
it is applied. The references are Owen andWinter [37] for
Φ, Carreras and Magaña [14] (see also Carreras and
Magaña [15]) for Ψ, and Alonso-Meijide et al. [4] for π
and μ. The multilinear extension, introduced by Owen
[31], becomes therefore a very interesting tool, for both
theory and practice, in the framewrk of coalitional values.
For a moment, we will disregard value μ and focus
on the remaining values Φ, Ψ and π. The important
point is that we have, then, parallel (i.e., very close)
axiomatic characterizations of these coalitional values.
We state them.
Theorem 4.1. (Vázquez et al. [44]) A coalitional value
satisfies B1, A2–A4 and B5 and B6 if, and only if, it is
the Owen value Φ.
Theorem 4.2. (Theorem 3.3 in this paper) A coalitional
value satisfies A1–A6 if, and only if, it is the Banzhaf–
Owen value Ψ.
Theorem 4.3. (Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro
[6]) A coalitional value satisfies A1–A4, B5 and B6
if, and only if, it is the symmetric coalitional Banxhaf
value π.
As is seen, the only basic difference between Φ and π
lies in the fact that the former is a coalitional φ-value
whereas the latter is a coalitional β-value. Instead, the
differences between Φ and Ψ arise in axioms A1/B1,
A5/B5 and A6/B6, the latter two pairs being linked by
an implication relationship, while the differences
between π and Ψ are limited to A5/B5 and A6/B6. We
feel that this is a complete generalization of Feltkamp's
[21] axiomatic characterizations of φ and β. It also
enhances the role of π as an “intermediate” value
between Φ and Ψ, and we wish to mention here that
Theorem 4.3 extends in a natural way to all symmetric
coalitional binomial semivalues π p for p ∈ [0, 1]
(introduced by Carreras and Puente [16]), as is shown in
Alonso-Meijide et al. [5].
It has not been an easy task to make changes on B5
and B6 in order to get, respectively, really simple andsharp axioms A5 and A6, those that mark the essential
differences between Φ and Ψ. It has been necessary to
“split hairs” accurately.
Which is the reason to have included the symmetric
coalitional Banzhaf value π in our considerations? Well,
Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro [6] realized that Ψ
fails to satisfy two in principle interesting properties of
Φ, namely B6 (quotient game property) and B7
(symmetry in the quotient game). Then they suggested
to modify Owen’s two-step allocation scheme (common
to Φ and Ψ ) and use β for sharing in the quotient game
and φ to sharing within unions. This gave rise to π, that
satisfies B6 and B7 but differs from the Owen value Φ in
satisfying A1 instead of B1. In Section 4.3, we will look
again at the meaning of π.
Now, we would like to refer to the work by Amer
et al. [10]. Their first axiomatic characterization of the
Banzhaf–Owen value on the domain of all coopera-
tive games was reached by considering six properties
that, for our purposes, do not need to be stated in
detail:
C1. Additivity.
C2. Dummy player property.
C3. Symmetry within unions.
C4. Many null players.
C5. Delegation neutrality.
C6. Delegation transfer.
Properties C1–C3 are standard in the literature. C4 is
perhaps the most striking one. C5 and C6 refer to the so-
called “delegation game”, close to Lehrer's [27]
“reduced game” but avoiding the use of different player
sets. In order to show–partially–the independence of
this axiom system, it is introduced in Remark 2.1(b) the
“fourth value” μ (a mixed coalitional value that can be
now viewed as a “counterpart” of π), since it satisfies all
properties but C4 (see Remark 3.3(a) in Amer et al.
[10]), thus proving that this “rare” property does not
follow from the remaining ones. The problem with this
axiomatic characterization is that it is far from any of
the existing ones for the Owen value Φ, as the authors
recognize in their Remark 3.3(b) following a sugges-
tion of a referee of their article, because Φ satisfies all
but property C6 but it is hard to imagine which
property–if any–would be able to replace C6 and
complete a hypothetical parallel axiomatization of Φ.
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of the work by Amer et al. [10] enforces still more our
result (Theorem 3.3).
Finally, let us deal with value μ. We first introduce
two more properties for a coalitional value g:
D1. (Many-quotient game property) If ðN ; v;PÞaGcs
and Pk∈P is such that pk= |Pk| >1 then
X
iaPk
giðN ; v;PÞ ¼ gkðM ; vP;PmÞ:
D2. (2-Efficiency within unions) For all ðN ; v;PÞaGcs,
any Pk∈P and any pair of distinct players i, j∈Pk,
giðN ; v;PÞ þ gjðN ; v;PÞ ¼ gijðNi;j; v i;j;P ijÞ;
where Pij is the partition that arises from P by simply
collapsing i and j in a single player ij.
Notice that property D1 and property A6 are
complementary particular cases of property B6. Fur-
thermore, it is not difficult to see that D2 coincides with
C6 (the delegation transfer property introduced by Amer
et al. [10]): the only difference is, roughly speaking,
that, in the original delegation transfer property, the
delegating player becomes a null player, whereas this
player disappears in D2.
Thus, B6\A6 and C6 are consistent notations for D1
and D2, respectively, so that we will use them in the
sequel.
Then, we have a fourth result concerning μ and using
C6 (Theorem 4.4), whose proof is omitted since it is
similar to that of Theorem 3.3, and a new and interesting
comparative table referred to the four values (Table 2)
where the splitting of B6 into A6 and B6\A6 matters.Table 2
New properties and coalitional values
Symbol Property Ψ π Φ μ
A1 2-Efficiency/total power OK OK
B1 Efficiency OK OK
A2 Dummy player OK OK OK OK
A3 Symmetry OK OK OK OK
A4 Equal marginal contributions OK OK OK OK
B5 Balanced contributions within unions OK OK OK OK
A6 1-Quotient game OK OK OK OK
B6\A6 Many-quotient game OK OK
C6 2-Efficiency within unions/delegation
transfer
OK OKTheorem 4.4. A coalitional value satisfies B1, A2–A4,
B5, A6 and C6 if, and only if, it is the counterpart
value μ.
Remark 4.5. Even a final axiomatic characterization of
Ψ can be stated, once we have considered C6. In effect:
a coalitional value satisfies A1–A4, B5, A6, and C6 if,
and only if, it is the Banzhaf–Owen value Ψ. The proof
is analogous to that of 3.3.
4.3. On the philosophy behind axiomatics
To close this section, we would like to make some
comments about what is behind this “logical game” of
axiomatizations.
For any value, understood as a solution concept for
cooperative conflicts, it is always interesting, in both
theory and practice, to have an explicit formula and even
an alternative computation procedure. This is the case of
the four coalitional values mentioned here, Φ, Ψ, π and
μ, all of which are obtained by combining the weighting
coefficients of φ and β in similar formulas and also by
applying the multilinear extension technique.
Also a list of properties of the value, as long as
possible, is always desirable. Then, why axiomatic
systems? There are some reasons for this interest of
game theorists in getting them. First, for a mathemat-
ically elegant and pleasant spirit. Second, because a set
of basic (and assumed independent and hence minimal)
properties is a most convenient and economic tool to
decide on the use of the value. Finally, such a set allows
a researcher to compare a given value with others and
select the most suitable one for the problem he or she is
facing each time.
Why are parallel axiomatic characterizations espe-
cially interesting? Because they favor ease when
comparing different options to be chosen as the
preferred value. (Of course, there may also be other
criteria to decide which is the most suited value/index to
describe the considered situation: the behavioral model,
the belonging or less to the core, the monotonicity–
according to various definitions–and so on.)
Then, we feel that one should strongly avoid being
dogmatic at this point. Probably, there is no value able to
cover all situations. For example, there is no unanimous
criterion to choose among using either the Shapley value
φ or the Banzhaf value β as power index in all cases.
We contend that pure and applied game theorists should
be flexible at most in this respect. On the one hand, in
both theory and practice, one has often to handle
additional information not stored in either the charac-
teristic function v of the game or the coalition structure
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few properties found in the literature can really be
considered absolutely compelling, i.e., almost no axiom
is compelling in vacuo, but only inserted in the
framework of a given, specific cooperative conflict.
Even those that appear as the best placed in this sense
might well be conditioned by the characteristics of the
problem where we pretend to use the value they define.
The conclusion is that all of us should look at axioms
with an open mind and without a priori value
judgements. The history of science is full of examples
of theoretical models that only after a certain period of
time have been proven to be useful in practice. Let us
briefly illustrate these considerations by means of some
simple instances.
Example 4.6. (a) Assume that N is a set of workers in a
given production area and P reflects the classification of
them into the firms they are working for. Assume,
besides, that g is a coalitional value that allocates to each
worker his salary and to each firm its (net) income (say,
per year in both cases). In this context, axiom B5
(balanced contributions within unions) is too weak since
here it seems more suitable to assume the stronger
hypothesis that the salary of a worker will not change if
a partner leaves the firm, and this is precisely axiom A5
(neutrality under individual desertion). Furthermore,
axiom B6 (quotient game property) is no compelling
either because the sum of the salaries of the workers of a
firm needs not coincide with the net income of the firm.
This seems too strong. However, if a worker creates and
holds his own firm alone, it is very reasonable that his
salary coincides with the net income of his firm, and this
is precisely the weaker axiom A6 (1-quotient game
property). Thus, we have in mind the Banzhaf–Owen
value Ψ.
(b) Now, assume that political parties are the agents
in a parliamentary context and the coalition structures
reflect the coalition formation. Assume, moreover, that
g is a coalitional value that measures, in some sense,
the “power” of both parties and coalitions. In this case,
A5 (neutrality under individual desertion) might not be a
reasonable property, but not necessarily should it be
automatically replaced with B5 (balanced contributions
within unions): maybe the effect on a party of the
desertion of a coalition partner is not the same as the
effect when the roles are interchanged. Also B6
(quotient game property) may be not completely
convincing, since the power concept at the coalition
level might well be different from power at the party
level, and hence the sum of the power indices of the
colligated parties might differ from the power of theirunion in the quotient game—at least, it is not completely
clear why they should coincide. Instead, it seems much
more reasonable that this coincidence holds in the case
of a party that remains isolated, and this is property A6
(1-quotient game).
(c) Still in the parliamentary framework, one can
consider that parties in the original game, and unions in
the quotient game, fight for something called “power”.
However, once each union gets its fraction of power in
the quotient game, it is often convenient to share this
index among its members efficiently. For example, and
especially, whenever the coalition is winning and gives
rise to a coalition government, that coalition will need
to share cabinet and parliamentary positions such as
presidencies and ministries and budgets management
among its members. Even if one prefers the Banzhaf
value as power index, he/she will apply it in the
quotient game, but will necessarily prefer the efficient
Shapley value when sharing within the union. In other
words, he/she will prefer the symmetric coalitional
Banzhaf value π, because of the failure of Ψ as to B6
and B7.
These examples show the relativity of the term
“compelling” and hence the convenience of looking at
axioms and axiomatic characterizations with no con-
straints and to appreciate those axiomatizations that
permit a comparison between different (coalitional, in
this case) values. We hope that the reader will hold this
view and agree, therefore, with our opinion so far
expressed.
Remark 4.7. Finally, we would like to point out an
additional criterion that supports the use of the
Banzhaf–Owen value Ψ as power index and comes
from a rather different, not axiomatic approach: the
probabilistic one. We are referring to a nice paper by
Laruelle and Valenciano [26] where three meanings of
Ψ are provided in the voting context. By interpreting
power as the ability–say, probability–to become
decisive in a voting process, the authors state three
interpretations of this coalitional value: (a) as a modified
Banzhaf index of the given voting rule; (b) as the
Banzhaf index of a modified voting rule; and (c) as an
(extended) Banzhaf index of an (extended notion of)
voting rule. Two conclusions of this article deserve also
being mentioned: (1) the Banzhaf–Owen values of
different agents can be compared only in case of players
of the same union, a condition to be taken into account
in the applications of this power index; (2) similar
interpretations of other coalitional values in the voting
context are problematic; in other words, the arguments
given for Ψ do not adapt convincingly to them.
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ification of this but give no hint.
5. Conclusions
We have provided (Section 3) a new axiomatic
characterization of the modified Banzhaf value for
games with a coalition structure (Owen [35]) on the full
domain of all cooperative games. It is the second
axiomatization of this value that is published, the first
one having been given by Amer et al. [10], but the basic
difference is that ours can be compared with parallel
characterizations of the classical Owen coalitional value
(Owen [33]), the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value
(Alonso-Meijide et al. [6]), and a counterpart of the
latter also found in Amer et al. [10]. Note that these four
values cover all ways of combining the use of the
Shapley and Banzhaf values, in the quotient game and
within the unions. We have also shown the logical
independence of our axiomatic system.
Next (Sections 4, 4.1 and 4.2) we have discussed our
axioms, relating and/or comparing them with other
properties that have previously appeared in the literature
on coalitional values, and putting in parallel different
sets of axioms to cope with the relevance of each one of
the four values and the essential differences between
them (Tables 1 and 2 and Theorems 4.1–4.4). In
particular, Theorem 4.4 provides the first axiomatic
characterization of the “counterpart” value, and even an
additional characterization of the modified Banzhaf
value for games with a coalition structure is given in
Remark 4.5. It seems also worthwhile to mention that all
four values can be computed by means of the multilinear
extension (last row of Table 1).
Finally, we have developed (Sections 4 and 4.3)
some reflections on the meaning of the axiomatizations
and enhanced the convenience to have such descriptions
of a given value and, moreover, when possible, parallel
axiomatizations, which should be useful to both
theorists and practitioners in order to choose, in each
situation they face, the best solution concept. We have
also expressed our criticism against too dogmatic views
when deciding on whether or not a given axiom is
“compelling”.
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